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ENSURING ONLY “GOOD GUYS” CAN GET GUNS1: HOW
IMPLEMENTATION OF A FEDERAL BACKGROUND CHECK
REQUIREMENT ON ALL FIREARM TRANSFERS CAN IMPACT
GUN VIOLENCE
Brendan P. Barry
“With the right to bear arms comes a great responsibility to use caution
and common sense . . .and it’s just plain common sense that there be a
waiting period to allow local law-enforcement officials to conduct
background checks on those who wish to purchase handguns.”2
-President Ronald Reagan
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1
This title references the long-held rationale of gun rights lobbyists, “The only way to
stop a bad guy with a gun is with a good guy with a gun,” which NRA Chief Wayne Lapierre
emphatically stated at a press conference in 2012 following the Sandy Hook massacre. See
Meghan Keneally, Breaking Down The NRA-Backed Theory That a Good Guy With a Gun
Stops
a
Bad
Guy
With
a
Gun,
ABC NEWS
(Oct.
29
2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/breaking-nra-backed-theory-good-guy-gunstops/story?id=53360480. Meanwhile, the NRA has continually fought legislation regulating
firearm sales and ownership making it easier for “Bad Guys” to get guns. See generally Jose
Pagliery, “NRA Slams Gun-Background System Flaws It Helped Create,” CNN (Feb. 14,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/23/us/nra-criticizes-gaps-it-created-in-gunbackground-system-invs/index.html.
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went into publishing this comment. A special thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor
Margaret Lewis, for her guidance and support throughout the writing process. Finally, I would
like to thank my wife, Emily, and my family for their patience, inspiration, and unwavering
support throughout this journey.
2
Steven A. Holmes, Gun Control Bill Backed by Reagan in Appeal to Bush, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Mar. 29, 1991 at A1. In an address at George Washington University marking
the 10th anniversary of John Hinckley’s unsuccessful assassination attempt that left former
Reagan Press secretary James Brady severely disabled, former President Reagan – a card
carrying member of the NRA – endorsed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and
background checks for those seeking to purchase a firearm.
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I. INTRODUCTION.
On October 21, 2012, Zina Haughton was enjoying an uneventful
Sunday morning, chatting and taking care of her regular clients at a day spa
in suburban Milwaukee.3 Haughton, according to others in the salon at the
time, seemed remarkably calm and collected when without warning her
estranged husband entered the salon waving a revolver in the air, screaming
for everyone to get on the floor.4 This was not the first time, but it would be
the last time, that Ms. Haughton would fall victim to her husband’s abuse.5
Radcliffe Haughton, who Zina had previously told a court “terrorize[d) [her]
every waking moment,” proceeded to murder her as well as two others in the
spa that morning. What is arguably worse than Zina’s tragic death, is the
fact that Mr. Haughton should not have been able to purchase the firearm he
used to murder her in the first place.6 Federal regulations make it unlawful
3
Carlos Sadovi, Witness to Salon Attack Says Zina Haughton Tried to Calm Armed
Man, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm2012-10-23-ct-met-milwaukee-salon-shooting-sidebar-20121023-story.html.
4
Id.
5
Michael Cooper, Michael S. Schmidt, & Michael Luo, Loopholes in Gun Laws Allow
Buyers to Skirt Checks, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 11, 2013), at A14.
6
Id. (“When Zina Haughton, 42, got a restraining order against her husband. . .he
became ineligible to buy a gun under federal law.”).
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for persons with active restraining orders to purchase firearms.7 Despite
these restrictions, Mr. Haughton evaded the background checks that would
have stopped him by exploiting a loophole in federal regulations and
purchasing his weapon from a private seller.8
Tragedies like this and countless other untold stories amplify the need
for lawmakers and the nation to re-evaluate the status of gun control
legislation and, specifically, the requirement for background checks.9 While
the national gun violence epidemic has resulted in countless public pleas for
heightened federal regulation, most gun control legislation has failed to
garner sufficient congressional support.10 Unfortunately, the political reality
is that the gun control debate is consistently plagued by partisan politics and
interest group opposition to any federal regulation. One area of the
discussion that has seen bipartisan public support with regularity over the
last ten years is the concept of universal background checks.11 Polling has
found that at least ninety percent of Americans are in favor of some type of
universal background check.12 The overwhelming support for universal
background checks, met with federal inaction, highlights the failure of
Congress to address this critical issue despite so many tragedies.
While Congress remains divided on federal gun control regulation,
states have implemented the majority of impactful gun control legislation,
where varying degrees of restrictions have led to similarly diverse results.13
7
18 U.S.C.S. §922 (d)(8) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise
dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe that such person. . .is subject to a court order that restrains such person from harassing,
stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or
person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear
of bodily injury to the partner or child. . .”).
8
Cooper, supra note 5.
9
See generally, Cooper, supra note 5.
10
Melina Delkic, Sandy Hook Anniversary: These Are the Gun Control Laws that Have
Failed
Since
the
Newtown
Shooting,
NEWSWEEK
(Dec.
14,
2017),
https://www.newsweek.com/sandy-hook-anniversary-gun-control-laws-failed-747415.
11
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Deal to Bolster Gun Background Checks Is Reached by
Senators, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 17, 2017, at A13; Katie Rogers, Trump Adds Cautious
Support to Changes to Background Checks for Gun Buyers, THE NEW YORK TIMES A13 (Feb.
20, 2018).
12
Matthew Miller, Lisa Hepburn & Deborah Azrael, “Firearm Acquisition Without
Background Check”, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 166, 233–239 (2017) (“Universal
background checks are favored by more than 90% of all Americans.”); Tim Malloy, U.S.
Support for Gun Control Tops 2-1, Highest Ever, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds;
Let Dreamers Stay, 80 Percent of Voters Say, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY POLL 1, 1 (2018),
https://poll.qu.edu/images/polling/us/us02202018_ugbw51.pdf (“Support for universal
background checks is itself almost universal, 97 – 2 percent, including 97 – 3 percent among
gun owners.”).
13
Ashley Welch, What Impact do State Gun Laws Have on Shooting Deaths?, CBS
NEWS (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gun-control-laws-state-impact-onshooting-deaths-suicide-study/.
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Based on the lack of standardization among individual states, state-level
firearm regulation cannot sufficiently address the nationwide issue of gun
violence.14 Without uniformity, one state’s weak regulation of firearms can
undermine the effectiveness of another state’s more comprehensive
regulation.15 Despite this reality and the significant popular support for
change, many states still do not require background checks to supplement
the gaps left by the current construction of federal statutes.16 While
differences in state-based regulation of firearms transfer can provide
valuable insight into the effects of various gun control measures without the
larger risk of failure on a national stage, the priority should be establishing a
national system of firearm regulations implementing minimum standards for
universal background checks.17
This comment will analyze various approaches to background checks
at the federal and state level and advocate for the adoption of a federal
requirement for universal background checks on all firearm transfers. Part
II will discuss how the history of gun control legislation has shaped the state
of current firearm regulations. It will also discuss the significant judicial
decisions that impact Congress’ ability to regulate firearms, and how those
decisions both limit and enable the institution of a universal background
check requirement in the future.
Part III will analyze the current construction of federal firearm transfer
regulations, address the background check gap that congress inadvertently
created for private sales, and discuss congressional and executive actions
taken to address the issue. It will then analyze supplementary state level
firearm regulations from Missouri, Connecticut, and California. Missouri
provides a unique example as a state which previously had supplemental
requirements for background checks but repealed the requirement in 2007.18
14

Patrick Luff, Regulating Firearms Through Litigation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1581, 1587
(2014) (“Although states have also passed gun control measures, state laws can be ineffective
because, unless there are uniform standards, weak gun controls in one state can undermine
stronger gun control efforts in other states.”). See Michael de Leeuw, Let Us Talk Past Each
Other for a While: A Brief Response to Professor Johnson, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1642–43
(2013) (describing “the relative ease and anonymity with which people can purchase
handguns in one state and then transport them elsewhere to sell on the street”).
15
Id.
16
Miller, supra note 12, at 235 (“State laws regulating private sales as of July 1, 2013
include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Washington, D.C.”).
17
See Allen Rostron, A New State Ice Age for Gun Policy, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
327, 360 (Summer 2016). The term “transfer” will be used generally throughout this note to
represent the sale, purchase, gift, or other means of exchange of firearms between two parties.
18
Niraj Chokshi, Study: Repealing Missouri’s Background Check Law Associated With
a
Murder
Spike,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
18,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/18/study-repealing-missouris-
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Both California and Connecticut have supplemental background check
requirements, and the comparison of their different approaches will
demonstrate each version’s strengths and weaknesses.
Part IV will use the state-based analysis to advocate for the federal
implementation of a minimum universal background check requirement
based on aspects of the different states’ approaches. This section will argue
that small change in the form of background checks at the point of transfer
will significantly impact the effectiveness of gun control efforts during
firearm transfer.
II. HOW LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE SHAPED MODERN FEDERAL
FIREARM REGULATIONS.
Federal requirements for background checks during the transfer of a
firearm have only been around since the mid-1990s, but the development of
current regulatory gaps in background check requirements can be traced to
the early 1900s.19 While congressional authority to regulate firearms is now
generally recognized, the series of seminal legislative initiatives and judicial
opinions that follow helped pave the circuitous route that led to the current
state of firearm regulation. First, this section will look at how Congress has
shaped firearm legislation over the last century, laying the foundation for the
current state of regulatory affairs. Second, this section will analyze the
impact the courts have had on limiting those regulations as well as clarifying
the role of Congress in regulating firearms transfer and ownership.
A. Legislative History of Federal Regulation on Firearm Transfers.
The National Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”) was the first major piece
of federal gun control legislation passed concerning the transfer of
firearms.20 Congress enacted the NFA to regulate the manufacture, import,
and transfer of specific firearms as defined in the act.21 The NFA “imposed
a tax on the making and transfer of firearms defined by the Act, as well as a
special (occupational) tax on persons and entities engaged in the business of
importing, manufacturing, and dealing in NFA firearms.”22 The Act also
required the registration of all NFA classified weapons with the secretary of
the treasury.23 While enacted under Congress’ taxing powers, the NFA was
background-check-law-associated-with-a-murder-spike/?utm_term=.67c039babc26.
19
See Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control Laws in America, TIME
(Feb. 22, 2018), http://time.com/5169210/us-gun-control-laws-history-timeline/.
20
Id.
21
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “National Firearms Act”,
(Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act.
22
Id.
23
Id. (“The law also required the registration of all NFA firearms with the Secretary of
the Treasury. Firearms subject to the 1934 Act included shotguns and rifles having barrels
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not intended for revenue collection and instead targeted an alternative goal,
to deter the use and transfer of weapons that were often used in crimes and
episodes of gang violence.24 This Act imposed a duty not only on all
transfers of the regulated weapons, but required persons possessing the
weapons to retroactively register them.25
The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 (“FFA”) developed a regulatory
framework for licensing firearms dealers that is the schematic for the modern
system.26 The FFA required persons “engaged in the business” of importing,
manufacturing, or dealing firearms to acquire federal firearms licenses
(“FFL”) from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(“ATF”).27 The FFA also prohibited classes of people from purchasing or
possessing firearms, most notably at this time convicted felons.28 Not only
was it a federal offense for convicted felons to purchase or possess a firearm,
but it was also a federal offense for any firearms dealer to knowingly transfer
a firearm to these prohibited purchasers.29
Significantly, in 1968 the Supreme Court held that the NFA provision
requiring firearm owners to register their firearms was unconstitutional.30
The Haynes decision left the NFA essentially unenforceable, forcing
Congress to amend Title II of the NFA by enacting Title II of the Gun Control
Act (“GCA”) of 1968.31 The amendments cured constitutional defects
present in the NFA and also repealed the FFA, adopting many of its
less than 18 inches in length, certain firearms described as “any other weapons,”
machineguns, and firearm mufflers and silencers.”).
24
Id. (“Congress found these firearms to pose a significant crime problem because of
their frequent use in crime, particularly the gangland crimes of that era such as the St.
Valentine’s Day Massacre. The $200 making and transfer taxes on most NFA firearms were
considered quite severe and adequate to carry out Congress’ purpose to discourage or
eliminate transactions in these firearms. The $200 tax has not changed since 1934.”).
25
Id.
26
James Jacobs & Zoe Fuhr, The Potential and Limitations of Universal Background
Checking for Gun Purchasers, 7 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 537, 539 (2017).
27
Id. (citing Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 785, §3(b), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251
(1938)). Notably, the FFA failed to define “engaged in the business” which would leave the
door open for interpretation in later statutes, leading to the private sales exception that plagues
gun control regulation today.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99–100 (1968) (holding that the provisions of
the NFA were unconstitutional on their face, and that a requirement for a felon, who would
become punishable as a prohibited owner of a firearm, to register the firearm would violate
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
31
Gray, supra note 19; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
“National Firearms Act”, (Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-andregulations/national-firearms-act (“In 1971, the Supreme Court reexamined the NFA in
the Freed case and found that the 1968 amendments cured the constitutional defect in the
original NFA.”).
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provisions under the new legislation.32 The GCA “regulated interstate and
foreign commerce in firearms, including importation, ‘prohibited persons’,
and licensing provisions.”33 In the wake of significant acts of gun violence
during the civil rights movement, specifically the assassinations of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the GCA
implemented strict regulations establishing new firearms offenses, as well as
expanding the classes of prohibited purchasers to include felons, the
mentally ill, and unlawful users of narcotics, among others.34 The primary
effect of the initial GCA language on the future of background checks was
to incorporate the former FFA requirement for “persons engaged in the
business” of manufacturing, distributing, and dealing firearms to obtain
FFLs.35
In 1983, Congress passed the Firearms Owners Protection Act
(“FOPA”), a significant indicator of the country’s conservative ideological
shift and the growing influence of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”).36
In dramatic shift from how the legislation had been interpreted in the past,
FOPA re-defined the “engaged in the business” provision as only applying
to,
“a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to
dealing [manufacturing, or distributing] in firearms as a
regular course of trade or business with the principal
objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive
purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not
include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or
purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal
collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his
personal collection of firearms.”37
The bill also enacted other limitations on gun control initiatives by
prohibiting a requirement for national registration of dealer’s firearm sale

32

Gray, supra note 19; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives,
“National Firearms Act”, (Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-andregulations/national-firearms-act (“In 1971, the Supreme Court reexamined the NFA in
the Freed case and found that the 1968 amendments cured the constitutional defect in the
original NFA.”).
33
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, “Gun Control Act of 1968”,
(Last visited Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/gun-control-act.
34
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 539–40.
35
18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (West 2018) (“No person shall engage in the business of
importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition,
until he has filed an application with and received a license to do so from the Attorney
General.”).
36
Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89.
37
18 U.S.C § 921(a) (21) (emphasis added); Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89.
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records, and by allowing licensed dealers to participate in gun shows.38
Following the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in
1981, which left White House Press Secretary James Brady permanently
disabled, a movement back towards liberal application of gun control
emerged, culminating in the passage of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1993 (“Brady Act”).39 The Brady Act significantly
modified the GCA by requiring that all FFL dealers conduct background
checks on purchasers to ensure they were not prohibited from purchasing a
firearm.40 Viewed in light of current amendments and other proposed
changes, opinions on effectiveness of the initial Brady Act have been
mixed.41
The Brady Act was seen as important because it established the
requirement that all federally licensed firearm dealers, manufacturers, and
distributors institute a waiting period between purchase of the firearm and
transfer to the purchaser, which Congress viewed as a strategy to prevent
heat of passion firearm purchases intended for violence.42 The waiting
period required chief local law enforcement officers (“CLEO”) to process
the purchaser’s application, conduct a background check, and within five
business days inform the FFL whether or not the sale could proceed.43 If the
CLEO did not inform the FFL within five business days that the purchaser
was a prohibited person, the FFL had the discretion to proceed with the
sale.44
After five years, the Act required that the waiting period would be
replaced by a national background checking system, which led to the creation
of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).45 The
initial Brady Act only applied to handguns but eventually the requirement
for FFLs to conduct NICS background checks would also apply to “longguns” such as rifles and shotguns.46 The Brady Act’s requirement for
background checks left significant gaps in the regulation of firearms
transfers based on its interaction with previous federal statutes and is a major
reason why universal background checks are not a federal requirement to this
38

Gray, supra note 19.
Gray, supra note 19.
40
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 541–42.
41
Luff, supra note 14, at 1589 (“According to one scholar, it was ‘this generation’s most
important federal gun control law . . . and, at the moment of its passage, [was] praised . . . as
a major turning point in the politics of gun control and crime control.’ Another scholar
observed, however, that the limitations of the Brady Act were actually modest. . .”).
42
Luff, supra note 14, at 1589.
43
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542.
44
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542.
45
Luff, supra note 14, at 1589.
46
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 542.
39
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day.47
Gun rights advocates recognized that 20th century legislation had laid
a foundation for more powerful firearm regulation in the future and turned
their focus to the courts to challenge the power of the federal government to
implement this legislation.
B. How Jurisprudence Has Simultaneously Strengthened and Limited
Congressional Authority to Regulate Firearms.
Traditionally, Congress relies on its broad regulatory powers under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to regulate the transfer and
possession of firearms.48 In some instances Congress has also regulated
manufacturing, importing, and dealing of firearms under their tax powers, as
demonstrated by the NFA, but generally modern statutes fall under the power
to regulate interstate commerce.49 Gun rights advocates primarily challenge
the authority of Congress to regulate the transfer and possession of firearms
on three grounds: (1) that Congress is exceeding the authority granted by the
Commerce Clause,50 (2) that Congress is regulating activity reserved to the
States in violation of the Tenth Amendment,51 or (3) that Congress’
regulations violate the protections of the Second Amendment and the
people’s right to bear arms.52 The following cases demonstrate how the
Court’s rulings on these challenges have both limited and solidified
congressional authority to regulate firearms possession and transfer.
1. Limits on Congressional Power to Enact Gun Control
Regulations after Lopez and Printz.
Prior to 1995 congressional authority to regulate firearms under the
Commerce Clause had been essentially unchallenged.53 In 1990, Congress

47

See discussion infra Section III.A.
VIVIAN CHU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43033, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE FIREARMS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2013) (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
Regulate Commerce with foreign Nationals, and among the several states, and with Indian
Tribes.”) (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
49
Id. at 1 n.8 (“The National Firearms Act of 1934 levies taxes regarding the
manufacture and transfer of certain firearms and other weapons. Therefore, it could be argued
that Congress is also relying on its authority under the Taxing Clause to enact this statute.
U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 1.”).
50
Id. at 4. See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
51
Chu, supra note 48, at 5. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
52
Chu, supra note 48, at 5. See also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
53
Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, Constitutional Law 142 (Robert C. Clark et
al. eds., 19th ed. 2016) (“For Nearly 60 years after the New Deal, the Court did not strike
down a single federal statute as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. . .
In 1995, a decision invalidating a congressional gun control law broke that longstanding
record.”).
48
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passed legislation making it a “federal offense ‘for any individual knowingly
to possess a firearm at a place the individual knows, or has reasonable cause
to believe, is a school zone.’”54 Following the arrest of a San Antonio high
school student under this provision, a challenge to the law made its way to
the Supreme Court in 1995.55 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion
of the Court holding that Congress had exceeded its authority by enacting
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (“Gun Control Act”).56 Justice
Rehnquist began by describing three categories of activity which the Court
has interpreted congressional authority to regulate in accordance with the
commerce power.57 The Court stated that Congress has the authority to
regulate “the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities,”
and “those activities having substantial relation to interstate commerce.”58
With the framework for testing the Gun Control Act established, the Court
quickly determined that to pass muster, the Act would have to regulate
activity which “substantially affects” interstate commerce in accordance
with the third category.59 Ultimately, the Court held that the mere possession
of a firearm within a school zone, could not be said to substantially affect
interstate commerce without an attenuated chain of events too far removed
to justify upholding the statute.60 Some saw this case as a significant
limitation of Congress’ ability to regulate the firearms in intrastate activities
54

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
56
Chu, supra note 48, at 2.
57
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
58
Id. at 559. (The Court went on to discuss the third kind of activity at length asking,
“whether an activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce in order to be
within Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.” Ultimately the Court held
that based on the weight of precedent, the proper test is to determine whether the activity in
question “substantially affects” interstate commerce).
59
Id. at 559; Chu, supra note 48, at 2-3 (“Under the first two categories, Lopez endorses
Congress’s ‘power to regulate all activities, persons or products that cross state boundaries.
So long as a federal regulation relates to interstate transactions or interstate transportation, the
federal regulation would be justified under the first two branchesFalse’ However, in
examining the School Zones Act, the Court concluded that possession of a gun in a school
zone was neither a regulation of the channels nor the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.”). Notably, the Court did discuss that the analysis might be different if there was
a jurisdictional element to the law, stating that a jurisdictional element might “limit [the
statute’s] reach to a discrete set of firearms possessions that additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.” Chu, supra note 48 at 3 n.24 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
60
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (“To uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would
have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.”).
55
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as a whole. Nonetheless, significantly for the future of firearm regulation,
while the Court found that Congress had exceeded their authority in Lopez,
a subsequent case has clarified the requirements of the “substantially affects”
doctrine.61
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court held that “Congress can regulate purely
intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for
sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would
undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”62 This
language supports upholding a congressional regulation of firearms transfers
without requiring actual evidence that the activities substantially affect
interstate commerce or undercut a larger regulatory scheme, so long as there
is a rational basis for Congress to make such conclusions.63 Subsequent
challenges to firearm regulation under the Commerce Clause have attempted
to undermine the ruling in Gonzales v. Raich as it applies to intrastate firearm
manufacturing and transfer under state law.64 Ultimately, the holding in
Gonzales v. Raich has withstood such challenges on the basis that
congressional regulations of intrastate manufacture and sale of firearms is
necessary to enable the successful implementation of any federal scheme of
firearm regulation.65 Similarly, in cases of intrastate “non-commercial”
transfer of firearms federal courts have held that, similar to the marijuana in
Raich, failure to regulate this “non-commercial” activity would interfere
with the larger regulatory framework.66
61

Chu, supra note 48, at 4 n.28 (“[T]he Court in Gonzales v. Raich subsequently
clarified that Congress still has considerable authority under the ‘substantially affects’
doctrine to regulate activity that is ‘quintessentially economic’ on the intrastate level, even
though the activity itself is not a part of interstate commerce.”) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).
62
Chu, supra note 48, at 4.
63
Chu, supra note 48, at 4.
64
See Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 978 (2013) (“[Plaintiff]
wants to manufacture firearms under the Montana Firearms Freedom Act, state legislation
that declares that the manufacture and sale of certain firearms within the state is beyond the
scope of Congress’s commerce power.”).
65
Chu, supra note 48, at 9 (“In upholding the validity of the National Firearms Act and
Gun Control Act as applied to the intrastate manufacture and sale of firearms and firearms
accessories, the district court stated that Congress had a rational basis, without the need to
have particularized findings, to conclude that failure to regulate intrastate manufacture and
sale of firearms would leave a ‘gaping hole’ in the federal scheme regulating firearms.”)
(quoting Montana Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104301, at *1 (D.
Mont. Aug. 31, 2010)).
66
Chu, supra note 48, at 13 (“The Sixth Circuit stated that guns, similar to marijuana,
are a ‘fungible commodity’ for which there is an established interstate market and that the
provision at issue is a part of the larger regulatory framework. The court concluded that the
relevant ‘legislative history supports the logical connection between the intrastate sale and
disposition of firearms and interstate market in firearms.’”) (quoting United States v. Rose,
522 F.3d 710, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2008)).

BARRY(DO NOT DELETE)

570

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

6/15/2020 10:56 PM

[Vol. 44:3

Another limitation on congressional ability to regulate firearms
transaction comes from the Tenth Amendment, and the anti-commandeering
principle announced in New York v. United States.67 As previously
discussed, the interim provisions of the Brady Act required CLEOs to
conduct background checks on persons wishing to purchase a firearm from
an FFL to determine if that person was a prohibited purchaser.68 In Printz v.
United States, a Montana CLEO challenged the constitutionality of the
Brady Act’s requirement, arguing that the provision was unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment.69 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, agreed
with the petitioners and held that the requirement for CLEOs to enforce the
provisions of the Brady Act was clearly a violation of the rule set forth in
New York, and that the provisions of the Brady Act were therefore
unconstitutional.70 While Printz invalidated the interim provision, the ruling
significantly did not address any issues with the congressional regulation of
firearms under the Commerce Clause.71 Justice O’Connor went beyond this,
specifically distinguishing in her concurrence that “[t]he Brady Act violates
the Tenth Amendment to the extent it forces States and local law enforcement
officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun owners and
to accept Brady Forms from firearms dealers. Our holding, of course, does
not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act.”72 Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence seems to indicate that a federally enforced regulatory system in
which state and local governments can voluntarily participate would be
67
Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53 at 182 (discussing the extension of the anticommandeering principle, preventing the federal government from forcing states to enact
legislation, to apply to federal laws directing state and local executive officials to enforce
federal legislation).
68
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26 at 542; See discussion, supra Section II.A.3.
69
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997).
70
Id. at 933 (“We adhere to that principle today, and conclude categorically, as we
concluded categorically in New York: ‘The Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.’ The mandatory obligation imposed on
CLEOs to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul
of that rule.”) (quoting United States v. New York, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
71
See generally id.
72
Printz, 521 U.S. at 935–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). But c.f. Printz, 521 U.S. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In my ‘revisionist’ view,
the Federal Government’s authority under the Commerce Clause . . . does not extend to the
regulation of wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions. Absent the underlying authority to
regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms, Congress surely lacks the corollary power to
impress state law enforcement officers into administering and enforcing such regulations.
Although this Court has long interpreted the Constitution as ceding Congress extensive
authority to regulate commerce (interstate or otherwise), I continue to believe that we must
‘temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence’ and return to an interpretation better rooted in
the Clause’s original understanding. Even if we construe Congress’ authority to regulate
interstate commerce to encompass those intrastate transactions that ‘substantially affect’
interstate commerce, I question whether Congress can regulate the particular transactions at
issue here.”) (internal citations omitted).
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constitutional under the Commerce Clause.73
Ultimately, while both Lopez and Printz were seen as wins for the progun rights lobby, limiting federal power to regulate firearms possession and
transfer, the holding in each case did very little to prevent congressional
power to regulate under the authority of the Commerce Clause.
2. How Individual Rights and Federal Gun Control apply PostHeller/McDonald.
The other primary challenge to any federal regulation of firearms
typically manifests as a challenge based on individual right to bear arms as
protected by the Second Amendment.74 Traditionally, this right to bear arms
was understood to bear relation to some association or affiliation with
contributing to the common defense in a militia.75 In 2008, the Supreme
Court essentially reversed seventy years of precedent in deciding District of
Columbia v. Heller.76
The petitioners in Heller challenged a thirty-two year-old handgun ban
in Washington, D.C. on the basis that the statute violated the Second
Amendment.77 The statute in Heller banned, among other things, the
possession, registration, and carry of handguns as well as requiring all
handguns to be locked and unloaded even when in a private citizen’s home.78
The Heller Court, analyzed the language of the Second Amendment based

73
Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“States and chief law enforcement officers may
voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program.”); See Chu, supra note 48 at 5.
74
U.S. CONST., amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
75
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (“In the absence of any evidence
tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen
inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to
keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly, it is not within judicial notice that this weapon
is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common
defense.”) (citation omitted). In Miller, the Court evaluated a claim that the defendants were
entitled to carry sawed-off shotguns under the protection of the Second Amendment. After
evaluating the text of the Second Amendment the Court determined that this type of weapon
was not protected as it served no real militia function, and its possession was not attributable
to supporting the common defense.
76
Gray, supra note 19.
77
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574 (2008).
78
Id. at 574–75 (“The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of
handguns. It is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is
prohibited. Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a handgun without a
license, but the chief of police may issue licenses for 1-year periods. District of Columbia law
also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned firearms, such as registered long guns,
‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device’ unless they are located
in a place of business or are being used for lawful recreational activities.”) (internal citations
omitted).
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on its two clauses, ultimately finding that the text of the Amendment coupled
with the historical context guarantees an individual right to possess arms.79
The majority, written by Justice Scalia, argued that the statute at issue would
fail any level of scrutiny.80 Despite not naming any specific level of scrutiny
with which the Court or lower courts should use regarding Second
Amendment challenges in the future, the opinion seems to suggest that a
heightened level of scrutiny is most appropriate.81 Justice Breyer, in his
dissent, contended exactly the opposite, arguing that even if the Second
Amendment applies—which he expresses doubts that it does—the District
of Columbia’s ordinance would survive the proper degree of scrutiny based
on a balancing of competing interests.82
While the decision in Heller was widely heralded as a major victory for
gun rights advocates, it does not severely limit the federal government’s
ability to regulate the transfer of firearms.83 Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the Second Amendment, similar to other rights, is not unlimited.84 He
then discussed a non-exhaustive list of current constitutionally valid
prohibitions and restrictions regarding the possession and transfer of
firearms, specifically identifying laws “imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”85
In 2010, the protections of Heller were extended to the states,
incorporated under the concept of due process.86 Since Heller was decided
in Washington, D.C. the Second Amendment was applied under federal law,
but the petitioners in McDonald v. City of Chicago argued that the ruling was

79

Sullivan, supra note 53 at 471.
LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, Summary and Analysis of District of
Columbia
v.
Heller,
2
(July
2008),
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/dc_v_heller_analysis.pdf.
81
Id. at 2 (“The majority opinion states that the handgun ban would fail any standard of
scrutiny . . . but does not articulate a standard that should be applied in evaluating other laws
under the Second Amendment.”) (citation omitted).
82
Sullivan, supra note 53, at 472 (“Under an appropriate balancing of interests, ‘which
focuses upon the presence of handguns in high-crime urban areas . . . [the D.C. ordinance]
represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed life-threatening problem,’
and is ‘tailored to’ that problem . . . “).
83
Sullivan, supra note 53, at 471.
84
Sullivan, supra note 53, at 471 (“[R]easonable restrictions on firearm ownership could
still be constitutional: ‘Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited.”).
85
Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53, at 471 (“Although we not undertake an exhaustive
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms ins sensitive places
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.”) (emphasis added).
86
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
80
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not applicable as the Second Amendment has no application to the states.87
Similar to the D.C. law, a Chicago ordinance effectively banned possession
of handguns by private citizens who resided in the city.88 In the majority
opinion, Justice Alito confirmed the holding in Heller, and held that based
on the fundamental nature of the Second Amendment and its deep roots in
the “nation’s history and tradition,” the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Second Amendment protections announced in
Heller to the States.89 The city relied on arguments Justice Breyer had made
in his Heller dissent, but the Court held that an interest balancing test was
not appropriate despite failing to identify a specific level of judicial scrutiny
for Second Amendment cases.90 More importantly for the development of
future gun control regulation, the opinion also reaffirmed the
constitutionality of longstanding prohibitions on possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, as well as laws conditioning or qualifying
commercial sales of arms.91
Ultimately, while Heller and McDonald were seen as overwhelming
victories for the pro-gun-rights lobby, placing restrictions on state and
federal authority to prohibit firearm possession and transfer, these cases also
solidified Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate the commercial
transfer of firearms. While challenges to firearms regulation will
undoubtedly continue, the holdings in Lopez, Printz, Heller, and McDonald
have certainly not prevented future development and implementation of a
federal system to regulate the transfer of firearms.
III. CURRENT BACKGROUND CHECK GAPS AND LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE,
AND STATE-BASED ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THEM.
As is evident from the historical construction of gun control in the
United States, the current system regulating the commercial and noncommercial transfer of firearms was not created with a single comprehensive
vision, but rather, has been pieced together over time. These incremental
changes and patchwork attempts at regulation are what have led to the
current gaps that plague federal legislation today. Recent attempts by the
87

Id. at 750.
Id.
89
Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 53, at 473-75.
90
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785–86.
91
Id. (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such
longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
sale of arms.’ We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.”) (internal
citations omitted).
88
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Legislative and Executive branches to remedy these gaps have been
unsuccessful, as the country remains divided on how to approach these
issues.92 In the face of federal failure, states have chosen how to regulate
firearms in varied ways with similarly varied results.93 Some scholars argue
that national remedies may be unattainable until state level regulation
determines approaches capable of obtaining nationwide support.94 It is
therefore appropriate to compare federal and state based attempts to regulate
the implementation of background checks in the transfer of firearms to get
an idea of what may be successful in the future. First, this section will look
at the current gap in background check requirements created by statutory and
regulatory language. After identifying the critical gap, the analysis will turn
to legislative, executive, and finally state-based attempts to address the hole
in background check requirements.
A. Statutory Gaps and Recent Legislative Attempts to Fix Them.
As was evident in Heller, some longstanding prohibitions on possession
and transfer of firearms are widely accepted as fundamental to regulation of
gun control.95 The GCA identifies nine classes of persons prohibited from
purchasing or possessing a firearm.96 The central mechanism to implement
those prohibitions, and what gives the law teeth, is the concept of universal
background checks.97 Unfortunately, based on the current construction of
federal laws, background checks are not required in all firearm transactions
or transfers.98 As previously discussed, the GCA requires that all persons
engaging in the business of manufacturing, distributing or dealing firearms
to obtain an FFL.99 Additionally, the Brady Act requires all FFLs to conduct
a background check through NICS on the recipient when transferring a
firearm.100 FOPA limited the definition of “engaged in the business” to
exclude those sellers who merely transfer firearms occasionally or as a
92

Rostron, supra note 17, at 328.
Rostron, supra note 17, at 328 (“While the gun issue has been stalled at the federal
level, some state legislatures have been more activeFalse [T]he nation continues to become
more fractures on [gun issues], with variation in state approaches to guns becoming even more
prominent than in the past.”). See discussion infra Part III(B).
94
Rostron, supra note 17, at 329.
95
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008).
96
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g). See Rostron, supra note 17, at 341 (“Federal laws disqualify
some people from having guns, such as convicted felons, fugitives, drug addicts, illegal aliens,
people with misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence or subject to domestic violence
restraining orders, and people who have been committed to a mental institution or determined
through court adjudication to have serious mental impairments.”).
97
Rostron, supra note 17, at 340–41.
98
Rostron supra note 17, at 341.
99
18 U.S.C.S. § 923(a).
100
18 U.S.C.S. § 922(t).
93
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hobby.101 This limitation allows for a person who is legally prohibited from
purchasing or owning a firearm to obtain one by purchasing from a seller
who is not obligated to conduct a background check.102 While it is still illegal
for the seller to transfer a weapon to a prohibited person, the statute requires
that the seller “knowingly” transfers the firearm to a prohibited party,
incentivizing private sellers to not ask questions or conduct background
checks when making a transfer.103 However, when background checks are
conducted, research shows that they prevent a significant number of
prohibited persons from purchasing and possessing firearms.104
Based on research and studies indicating the benefits of background
checks, the federal government has attempted through legislative and
executive powers to address the regulatory gap. In 1994, gun control
advocates looked to build upon the gains made by the Brady Act and
introduced the Gun Violence Protection Act of 1994 (“Brady II”).105 Brady
II attempted to close the gap by making it illegal for any individual to transfer
a handgun to an individual that is not an FFL, or does not have a state issued
handgun license.106 Similarly in 1999, the Gun Show Accountability Act
attempted to extend the background check requirement to transactions where
any part of the transaction occurs at a gun show or is initiated at a gun show
and occurs at a different time and location.107 In 2013, Congress once again
sought to reduce the “gun show loophole” through the creation of the
Manchin-Toomey Amendment.108 Even if the bill had passed and become
law, the Manchin-Toomey Amendment alterations were detrimentally
under-inclusive and would not have sufficiently closed the gap for all private
sales as they merely restricted the transfer of firearms at gun shows.109 All
three of these legislative efforts failed to garner sufficient support in
Congress to be submitted to the President and therefore none ever became

101

18 U.S.C § 921(a) (21); Luff, supra note 14, at 1588–89.
Rostron supra note 17, at 341.
103
18 U.S.C. § 922(t).
104
Andrew McClurg, In Search of the Golden Mean in the Gun Debate, 58 HOW. L.J.
779, 790-91 (2015) (Stating that despite regulatory gaps, and system imperfections,
background checks can still be effective, “A Justice Department report estimated that between
1994 (when background checks went into effect) and 2010, background checks prevented
more than 2.1 million prohibited purchasers from obtaining guns from licensed dealers.”)
(emphasis added).
105
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 545.
106
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 545 (citing Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994,
S. 1878, 103d Cong. (1994); Gun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, H. 3932, 103d Cong.
(1994)).
107
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546 (citing Gun Show Accountability Act, S. 443,
106th Cong. § 931(c)(1) (1999)).
108
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546.
109
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546–548.
102
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law.110
B. Executive Approaches to Gun Control.
Following the San Bernardino Massacre in 2015, President Barack
Obama grew tired of Congress’ inaction on gun control initiatives and
attempted to implement some of his own through a series of executive
orders.111 While there was significant opposition from gun rights activists
and lobbying organizations like the NRA, the executive actions really did
little to affect the way regulation of firearm transfers occurred.112 The
executive orders essentially reiterated enforcement guidance for the ATF to
employ when determining whether someone is engaged in the business of
selling firearms.113 The agency guidance did not alter enforcement of the
existing law, it did not require more firearm sellers to obtain FFLs, and really
only served to clarify what quantity and frequency of sales indicate whether
or not someone is engaged in the business of selling firearms.114 Prior to
leaving office, President Obama also attempted to strengthen existing
background check systems through an executive order requiring the Social
Security Administration to send NICS records of mentally disabled people
for use in the background check database.115
When President Trump took office in 2017, he made good on campaign
promises to roll back the gun control efforts of the Obama Administration.116
President Trump not only blocked the Social Security Administration order,
weakened the NICS system, but also had the Justice Department narrow its
definition of fugitives who are prohibited from purchasing weapons.117 After
the Parkland School Shooting in 2018, President Trump surprised many by
showing support for initiatives to strengthen background checks.118 Since
110

Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 546–51.
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 555 (citing Press Release, White House Office of
the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Executive Actions to Reduce Gun Violence and Make Our
Communities Safer (Jan. 4, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-gun-violence-and-make-our).
112
Rostron, supra note 17, at 336–37.
113
Rostron, supra note 17, at 336–37
114
Jacobs & Fuhr, supra note 26, at 556–57.
115
Gregory Korte, “Trump Signs Bill Reversing Obama Rule to Ban Gun Purchases by
Mentally
Ill,”
USA
TODAY,
Feb.
28,
2017,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/28/trump-sign-bill-blocking-obamagun-rule/98484106/.
116
Beth Reinhard & Sari Horwitz, “The Trump Administration Has Already Been
Rolling Back Gun Regulations,” THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 4, 2017,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/the-trump-administration-has-already-beenrolling-back-gun-regulations/2017/10/04/5eaad7d6-a86b-11e7-8ed2c7114e6ac460_story.html?utm_term=.5e8fa398f186.
117
Id.
118
Tessa Berenson, “Here’s Where President Trump Stands on 5 Gun Control Ideas”
111
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that time President Trump has retreated on this position, taking stances that
mirror those of the Republican Party and the NRA on the issue of
background checks, most recently promising to veto the Bipartisan
Background Checks Act of 2019 should it pass in both houses of Congress.119
Ultimately, the actions of the executive branch in recent history has done
little to improve the effectiveness of gun control through background checks.
C. Comparative Analysis of State Based Approaches to Background
Checks.
As federal attempts to strengthen background check requirements for
firearm transfers have come up short, many states have decided to
supplement the baseline federal requirements. States have employed a
variety of methods to help strengthen regulation of firearm purchase and
possession with similarly varied results.120 Below is a comparison of three
states with different approaches to regulation: (1) Missouri, (2) Connecticut,
and (3) California. Missouri does not supplement federal regulation, while
the latter two states have supplemented federal background check
requirements in different ways with different levels of effectiveness.
1. Missouri.
Missouri is rated forty-sixth in terms of state gun law strength.121
Missouri is an interesting case study because the state is a prime example of
why permit to purchase, or universal background checks, are so effective.
Permit to Purchase (“PTP”) regulations require firearm purchasers to obtain
a license confirming they have already passed necessary background check
procedures under federal and state requirements before they are able to
finalize a firearm transaction.122 In 2007 Missouri repealed their permit to
purchase requirement, and since that time have seen the number of firearmsrelated homicides increased approximately twenty-five percent.123
Following the repeal of the almost ninety-year-old law, Missouri also saw a
TIME (Mar. 12, 2018), http://time.com/5195469/donald-trump-gun-control-white-house/.
119
Jacob Pramuk, House Passes Another Bill to Strengthen Gun Background Checks as
Trump Pledges to Veto, CNBC (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/28/housepasses-gun-control-background-check-bill-trump-pledges-to-veto.html.
120
See McClurg, supra note 104, at 790–93; Rostron, supra note 17, at 341–43; Jacobs
& Fuhr, supra note 26, at 564–66.
121
Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2018,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
122
Daniel Webster, et. al., Effects of the Repeal of Missouri’s Handgun Purchaser
Licensing Law on Homicides, 91 J. OF URBAN HEALTH 293, 294 (2014).
123
Id. at 296 (In 2008, at the first full year after the permit-to-purchase licensing law was
repealed, the firearm homicide rate in Missouri increased sharply to 6.23 per 100,000, a 34 %
increase from the baseline mean. For the post-repeal period of 2008–2010, the mean annual
firearm homicide rate was 5.82, 24.9 % higher than the pre-repeal mean. . .”).
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sharp increase in the number of crime guns that originated from in-state
retailers.124 Following the repeal of the PTP laws, Missouri also saw its
firearm suicide rates raise by sixteen percent.125 Missouri now has the third
highest gun death rate per one hundred thousand people in the country at
21.3 deaths per one hundred thousand people.126 Following the repeal, the
state does not require background checks prior to the transfer of firearms
between private unlicensed parties.127 This has led to Missouri being in the
top half of states in crime gun exports, meaning that guns purchased in
Missouri were used and recovered following crimes in other states.128 The
researchers felt confident that “the study provides compelling confirmation
that weakness in firearm laws lead to death from gun violence.”129 While
Missouri provides a compelling study into the effects removing background
checks can have on gun violence, Connecticut makes a similarly compelling
display of the positive effects more restrictive requirements can have.
2. Connecticut.
In 1995, Connecticut enacted a law supplementing federal requirements
for background checks by requiring all handgun purchasers to obtain a
permit from local police and mandating a minimum of eight hours safety
training.130 Conducting a statistical analysis to estimate the effect of the PTP
laws on Connecticut’s homicide and suicide rates, researchers found a
reduction in both the state’s homicide and suicide rates.131 Multiple studies
showed that the PTP laws reduced the overall level of lethal gun violence as
the firearm related homicide rate dropped by nearly forty percent,132 and the
firearm related suicide rate dropped nearly fifteen percent.
Following the tragedy at Sandy Hook, the Connecticut legislature
continued to bolster the regulations on firearms in 2013, making background
124

Id. at 294 (“Webster and colleagues reported that immediately following the repeal of
Missouri’s PTP handgun law, there was a twofold increase in the percentage of guns that had
unusually short intervals between the retail sale and the recovery by police, an indicator of
firearm diversion or trafficking. The repeal also coincided with a sharp increase in the
percentage of crime guns recovered by police in Missouri that had been originally sold by instate retailers, from 56.4 % in 2006 to 71.8 % in 2012.”).
125
Cassandra Crifasi, et. al., Effects of Changes in Permit-to-Purchase Handgun Laws
in Connecticut and Missouri on Suicide Rates, 79 PREVENTATIVE MEDICINE 43, 47 (2015).
126
Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2018,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
127
Gifford’s Law Center, Missouri State Gun Laws, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/state-law/Missouri/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020).
128
Id.
129
Chokshi, supra note 18.
130
Rostron, supra note 17 at 347.
131
Kara Rudolph, et. al., Association Between Connecticut’s Permit-to-Purchase
Handgun Law and Homicides, 105 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH e49, e51-53 (2015).
132
See id.; see also Crifasi, supra note 125, at 47.
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checks necessary for all types of firearms, not only handguns, as well as
ammunition.133 The Executive Director of Connecticut Against Gun
Violence cites these changes as leading to one of the lowest years of gun
violence in the state’s history.134 He reported that gun-related homicides in
the state had reduced significantly following implementation of the
additional background checks, referencing that the state previously had, on
average, about ninety-two gun-related homicides per year compared to only
fifty-three in 2016.135
3. California.
California has supplemented federal gun control legislation by
requiring a background check for all gun sales at the point of transfer.136
Since 1991, California has required all persons not in the business of selling
firearms to transfer through an intermediary when conducting a transaction
with an un-licensed individual.137 Gifford’s Law Center to Prevent Gun
Violence rates California as the number one state in terms of gun law
strength.138 They possess one of the lowest gun-related death rate per one
hundred thousand people at 7.45, the seventh lowest gun related death rate
in the country, placing behind only other states who also supplement federal
background check requirements.139 California also has the fifth lowest rate
of guns exported to other states which are used to commit crimes.140 Despite
California’s efforts to reduce gun violence through supplemental laws, its
efforts may be undercut if prohibited persons unable to acquire firearms in
California can access firearms in Nevada or Arizona where laws are not as

133

Lori Mack, What’s Been the Impact of Connecticut’s Gun Laws After Sandy Hook?,
WNPR NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.wnpr.org/post/whats-been-impact-connecticutsgun-laws-after-sandy-hook.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Rostron, supra note 17, at 341–42.
137
Rostron, supra note 17, at 341 (“The process essentially involves using a licensed gun
dealer as an intermediary between the owner of the gun and the person seeking to buy it. The
owner takes the gun to a licensed dealer, and the dealer runs a background check on the
prospective purchaser. If the purchaser passes the background check, the purchaser gets the
gun. If not, the dealer returns the gun to the owner.”).
138
Gifford’s Law Center, Annual Gun Law Scorecard 50 State Rankings 2017,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/scorecard/#rankings (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
139
Id.; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Firearm Mortality by State,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/firearm_mortality/firearm.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2020).
140
Gifford’s Law Center, California State Gun Laws, http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/state-law/California/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
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The success of California’s current gun control measures has enabled
the state to continue developing the regulations that they hope will reduce
gun violence in the future.142 Some of these measures include expanded bans
on purchase, possession, and ownership of firearms by those afflicted with
mental disorders or those with previous domestic violence convictions.143
While gun rights advocates have contested the effect of these proposals on
violence in the Golden State, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence
maintains that these laws continue to save lives.144
It is evident from the state-based analysis that supplemental
requirements for background checks have a significant impact on lethal
violence inflicted with firearms.145 While current federal laws struggle to
address the ability of prohibited purchasers from acquiring firearms,
examples provided by states continue to demonstrate the effectiveness of
minimum background check standards. In his New State Ice dissent, Justice
Brandeis opined that variation in state laws provide a valuable opportunity
for experimentation in policy, effectively serving as a source of trial and
error to determine both successful and unsuccessful policies.146 While states
can serve as an effective laboratory for testing the validity of various gun
control measures, this analysis would suggest that universal background
checks have already passed the initial viability test and should be
implemented at the federal level. Even though the impact of states making
poor choices regarding policy may be better than a national implementation
of faulty regulation, the impact will nevertheless be harmful to those
affected.147 In the area of gun control the harm to those affected is
significant, and therefore it is time to move past state testing and implement
a federal requirement that all firearms transfers require background checks.
IV. PROPOSAL TO ADOPT A FEDERAL MINIMUM UNIVERSAL BACKGROUND
CHECK REQUIREMENT.
Perfect is the enemy of good when it comes to gun control legislation,
and a small change in background check requirements that can be
implemented now should be the short-term goal. Making a small, measured
141
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change to federal regulation of firearms will not prevent more state-based
analysis to continue on what subsequent measures should be taken to reduce
gun violence. But rather than wait while the damage continues to amass, the
best approach is to enact a minimum federal requirement for universal
background checks at the point of any firearm transfer similar to the
California approach. As previously mentioned, government and the public
widely support universal background checks.148 The impacts of requiring
background checks in various forms is evident based on the disparity in
firearm-based violence amongst states with and without supplemental
procedures.149 In Missouri, a House Resolution imposed numerous
restrictions and measures intended to deter would-be purchasers of
firearms.150 The failure of this bill shows how an over-inclusive approach to
gun control legislation limits the possibility that an effective law will actually
pass. While many of these provisions may be worth considering, it is better
to utilize the state laboratory approach to evaluate more controversial
requirements once universal background checks are already in effect at the
federal level.
Another pitfall to avoid in creating a minimum standard is being underinclusive. Similar to the Manchin-Toomey Amendment, legislators must be
wary of closing small gaps such as the “gun show loophole” while leaving
all other private transactions unregulated.151 The recent proposal of House
Resolution 8 (H.R. 8), or the Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019, is
the closest legislation has come to achieving the kind of change that this
analysis believes will create a small but significant first step towards future
change.152 H.R. 8 requires all unlicensed firearms dealers to transfer firearms
through an FFL holder implementing the current background check
requirements for FFLs to be enforced on all transfers.153 By keeping this bill
limited to background checks, gun control advocates are hopeful that the bill
will pass through Congress, despite facing an uphill battle in the Republican
controlled Senate.154 While opposition from conservative gun rights
lobbyists is significant, this kind of change can initiate a movement for larger
148
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overhaul in gun control.155 In February 2019, H.R. 8 passed through the
House of Representative and was co-sponsored by 5 Republican members.
While a positive step, the vote was primarily along party lines and President
Trump already indicated he would veto the bill if it eventually passes through
the Senate.156
While this “solution” will not solve all of the gun violence issues in the
United States, it will be the first step to addressing other significant
challenges. Having mandatory background checks in place will enable
legislators to examine how those systems can be further improved through
methods such as enhancing the accuracy and speed of NICS,157
implementing waiting periods,158 and assessing other holes in the
background check system like the “Charleston Loophole”.159 Universal
background checks are not the cure; instead, a minimally invasive,
marginally controversial remedy is needed to begin tackling one of the
nation’s most critical issues.
V. CONCLUSION.
The requirement for universal background checks will by no means
solve all of the problems in the weapons transfer universe. As evidenced by
history, gun control legislation will slowly be pieced together over time but
implementing this kind of federal uniformity can at least begin refurbishing
a broken system. Critics of this kind of minimum universal background
check requirement will continue to argue that many of the mass shootings
and murders in recent memory would not have been prevented by a
background check.160 The only argument that needs furnishing in return is:
what about the one that could have prevented. President Obama passionately
championed this message in the days after the Sandy Hook shooting,
pleading with the nation and the government for even incremental change by
stating the complexity of the problem is no longer tolerable as an excuse for
155
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doing nothing.161 He implored the nation to recognize that while there are
no individual regulations or combination of laws that will prevent every
senseless act of violence, “We know such violence has terrible consequences
for our society. And if there is even one thing that we can do to prevent any
of these events, we have a deep obligation—all of us—to try.”162
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